G-1181 - 03/23/2021 - POLICE DEPARTMENT - Ordinances ITEM 9.A.2
BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING
VILLAGE OF SAMUEL E. DEAN BOARD ROOM
OAK B R , K BUTLER GOVERNMENT CENTER
t 1200 OAK BROOK ROAD
OAK BROOK, ILLINOIS
630-368-5000
AGENDA ITEM
Regular Board of Trustees Meeting
of
March 23, 2021
SUBJECT: An Ordinance to Amend the Village Code amending Title 4, Chapter 4,
Section B in the Oak Brook Code of Ordinances.
FROM: James R. Kruger Jr., Chief of Polic9/11�
BUDGET SOURCE/BUDGET IMPACT: None
RECOMMENDED MOTION: I move that the Village Board approve Ordinance 2021-
PD-RPL-PANH-G-1 181 amending Title 4, Chapter 4, Section B in the Oak Brook Code
of Ordinances..
Background/History:
Since the beginning of the pandemic, we have seen an increase in panhandlers on street
corners soliciting money in our community. This has led to a steady increase in activity
for the past eighteen months after receiving guidance from States Attorney Berlin's office
and IRMA of a preliminary injunction to curtail enforcement of 625ILCS5/11-1006(c)due
to a case pending in federal court.
On January 14, 2021 a Seventh Circuit federal judge permanently banned Illinois'
panhandling law and any similar local ordinances from being enforced on the basis the
statute violates the First Amendment. The Federal Court of the Northern District of Illinois
issued an Injunction order forbidding state law or local ordinances on panhandling from
being enforced. While I understand the concerns of residents and visitors, and agree with
many of them, police departments have been put in an unfortunate position of not having
the authority to enforce the laws as they pertain to panhandling currently on the
books. The law suit filed in Federal court by the ACLU on behalf of two homeless persons
stated that their rights to free speech were being infringed upon by the enforcement of these
panhandling laws by the police.
BOT AGENDA Page 1
96
I subsequently made the decision to order my officers to discontinue from responding to
these calls by passing motorists after the January 14th ruling. While I understand the
frustration and the potential traffic safety hazards this may create I am also concerned
continually responding to these complaints and demonstrating a police presence with these
individuals, that now have a constitutional right to be there, may constitute a 42 US
Code, Section 1983 claim. Mere presence can no longer serve as a reason to believe
there is a safety concern on its face. The majority of communities in the region have
also begun to repeal these ordinances as well. There will need to be a legislative fix
based on traffic and pedestrian regulations rather than the act of solicitation coming from
the General Assembly.
Recommendation:
Staff recommends that the Village Board approve Ordinance 2021-PD-RPL-PANH-
G-1181.
BOT AGENDA Page 2
THE VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK
COOK AND DUPAGE COUNTIES, ILLINOIS
ORDINANCE
NUMBER 2021-PD-RPL-PANH-G-1 181
AN ORDINANCE REPEALING
TITLE 4 CHAPTER 4
SECTION 4-4B-2(C) AND 4-4B-5(F) OF
THE VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK
CODE OF ORDINANCES
GOPAL G. LALMALANI, Village President
CHARLOTTE K. PRUSS, Village Clerk
JOHN BAAR
PHILIP CUEVAS
MICHAEL MANZO
MOIN SAIYED
EDWARD TIESENGA
ASIF YUSUF
Village Board
Published in pamphlet form by authority of the
President and the Board of Trustees of the Village of Oak
Brook on this 23rd day of March, 2021
ORDINANCE NO.2021-PD-RPL-PANH-G-1181
AN ORDINANCE REPEALING
TITLE 4 CHAPTER 4
SECTION 4-4B-2(C)AND 4-4B-5(F)OF
THE VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK
CODE OF ORDINANCES
WHEREAS,the Village of Oak Brook(hereinafter referred to as the"Village")is an Illinois
Municipal Corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Illinois;
WHEREAS,the Village has in full force and effect a codified set of ordinances which are
of a general and permanent nature,which said codified set is known and designated as the Village
Code of the Village of Oak Brook,as amended;
WHEREAS,the Village has the authority to adopt ordinances and to promulgate rules and
regulations that pertain to its government and affairs that protect the health,safety and welfare of
its residents including the adoption and imposition of certain taxes;
WHEREAS,the Village continuously monitors and reviews its Village Code to ensure that
it is properly updated and revised to coincide with any current developments;
WHEREAS,the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division held in a Final Order issued on January 11, 2021 in the case of Dumiak v.Village of
Downers Grove that Section 11-1006(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code allowing municipalities to
regulate the solicitation of contributions on public highways violates the First Amendment and is
therefore unconstitutional on its face;
WHEREAS,both Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-4B-2(C)and Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-46-
5(F) of the Village's code regulating Solicitation in Public Roadways implement Section 11-
1006(c)of the Illinois Vehicle Code;
WHEREAS,the Corporate Authorities of the Village of Oak Brook are of the opinion that
that it is in the best interests of the safety,health and welfare of the residents to repeal the portion
of the Village Code as set forth herein.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED, in open meeting assembled by the Village
President and Board of Trustees of the Village of Oak Brook,Cook and DuPage Counties,Illinois
as follows:
i
Section One-Recitals
The Board of Trustees hereby find that all of the recitals hereinbefore stated as contained
in the preamble to this ordinance are full, true and correct and do hereby, by reference,
incorporate and make them part of this ordinance as legislative findings.
2
Section Two—Repeal of Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-4B-2(C)
Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-4B-2(C)shall be repealed in its entirety:
safety that desire to engage iR 691ir-itatien for a nharitable eFganization on the designated
vehin-WaF Wners 9f aRy publiG Feadway,must,no later than ten(10)dayes pFiqF te the
stating in full the fellewing additional information-
. GonduGted;
wil1essar;
damage that may aFise GUt Of,OF in GenneGtien with,the selinitation.
Section Three—Amendment of Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 446-2(D):
Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-413-2(D)shall be amended as follows:
D. Certificate Of Registration Issued: Except as provided by section 4-46-4 of this article,
upon receipt of an application, the individual designated by the chief of police shall
forthwith issue the person a certificate of registration. The Ghief of peliGe shall issue a
pemeps employed by the village to pFeteGt the publiG safety, that desiFe to engage in
Feadway RG lateF than five (5) business days afteF FeGeiving a fully and aeGuFately
.(Ord.G-
974,7-10-2012)
Section Four—Amendment of Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-4B-5(E)
Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-413-5(E)shall be amended as follows:
E. Time Limits:No person shall engage in noncommercial solicitation at any time prior to
nine o'clock(9:00)A.M.or after nine o'clock(9:00)P.M.,local time,
3
Section Five—Repeal of Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-4B-5(F)
Title 4 Chapter 4 Section 4-4B-5(F)shall be repealed in its entirety:
rode,with the sale eXGeptiGR Gf village law eRfGFGement peMannel,fiFefghter6, or Gthe
peF6GA6 empleyed by the village to PFGteGt the PUb1iG Safety WhO have FeGeived a GeFtif Gate
of FegistFatien frGm the Ghief Of P01 Ge.All 601 G tat on in the designated vehin,dar lanes A
pub!G safety�
1 No n oI Gital�nn may nede the flog.i ofyehni jlar o pedestrian
themse"4e1;or then Fal pUblin
de.:nn flan banner balloon other form of attention netting dey G Wh'nh n Id
d'str..nt dr..nrn n pthen 0-;A.n stn n hn-.nrd
No more than four(4) persons may simultaneously engage n 601 G tat on at any
nternent�en.n the Y Ilann
4. Ne p 1 SG1iGitatiGR at n Y tm,epr�te sda;:seaF after saaset.
Section Six—Effective Date
That this ordinance become effective immediately after its passage.
Section Seven-Conflict Clause
That all ordinances, parts of ordinances or board actions in conflict with the terms of this
ordinance shall be repealed to the extent of said conflict.
Section Eight-Passage Clause
That this ordinance shall take full force and effect from and after its passage,approval and
publication as provided by law.
Section Nine-Constitutionality Clause
Any part or parts of this ordinance declared by a court of law to be invalid or
unconstitutional shall not affect the validity of the remaining provisions of this ordinance or the
Oak Brook Municipal Code.
Section Ten-Publication
This ordinance shall be published in book or pamphlet form as provided by the Illinois
Municipal Code.
4
Section Eleven - Recording
This ordinance shall be entered into the minutes and upon the journals of the Board of
Trustees of the Village of Oak Brook.
APPROVED THIS 23rd day of March, 2021
Gopal G. Lalmalani
Village President
PASSED THIS 23rd day of March, 2021
Ayes: Trustees Baar, Cuevas, Manzo, Saiyed, Tiesenga, Yusuf
Nays: None
Absent: None
ATTEST:
Charlotte K. Pruss
Village Clerk
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5
Case:1:19-cv-05604 Document#:52 Filed:07/29/20 Page 1 of 9 PagelD#:299
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL DUMIAK and )
CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, )
Plaintiffs, )
Case No. 19 CV 5604
V. )
Judge Robert W.Gettleman
VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, )
JEFFREY GIERMANN,ROBERT JACOBS, )
JAY JOHNSON,KENNETH LISTER, )
ALESSIA MAROCCO,and JOSHUA NELSON, )
Downers Grove Police Officers, )
in their individual and official capacities, )
BRENDAN KELLY, )
Acting Director of the Illinois State Police, )
in his official capacity, )
and )
ROBERT BERLIN, )
DuPage County State's Attorney, )
in his official capacity, )
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Village of Downers Grove passed an ordinance making it illegal to solicit money
without a permit.No permit is needed for"political or religious activities."Violating the Village
ordinance can mean fines or court supervision.The State of Illinois has a similar statute:
"No person shall stand on a highway for the purpose of soliciting contributions from the
Case:1:19-cv-05604 Document#:52 Filed:07/29/20 Page 2 of 9 PagelD#:300
occupant of any vehicle except within a municipality when expressly permitted by municipal
ordinance."Violating the Illinois statute is a misdemeanor offense.
Plaintiffs Michael Dumiak and Christopher Simmons are homeless.They allege that they
were ticketed,prosecuted,and fined for panhandling.They stood on an elevated median strip at a
four-way intersection in Downers Grove and asked for money to help meet their basic needs—
money for bus fare,motel rooms,a cell phone.They sought money from people sitting in passing
cars.They held cardboard signs:"GOD BLESS U";"Anything Helps";"Trying to Keep
WARM';"Thank U!".
Plaintiffs sued the Village of Downers Grove and six of its police officers(together,
"defendants")under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.(Plaintiffs also sued other defendants not relevant here.)
The Village repealed the ordinance after plaintiffs sued,mooting plaintiffs'claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief.See New York State Rifle&Pistol Association.Inc.v.City of New York,
140 S.Ct. 1525,1526(2020).
Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated their free speech rights under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.They claim that the statute and former ordinance
drew unconstitutional distinctions based on content.They claim that defendants are liable for
enforcing those laws and seek damages.Defendants move to dismiss.Their motion is denied.
DISCUSSION
In ruling on defendants'motion to dismiss,the court takes plaintiffs'allegations as true.
Erickson v.Pardus,551 U.S.89,94(2007).The Village police officers assert qualified immunity,
arguing that they violated no clearly established First Amendment law.The court disagrees.The
officers started enforcing the statute and ordinance against plaintiffs in 2018.First Amendment
law at that time was clearly established:a speech restriction targeting panhandling discriminates
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based on content and survives constitutional muster only when supported by a compelling
justification.The statute and former ordinance fall short.
The Village argues that plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the Village under Monell v.
Den't of Social Services of City of New York,436 U.S.658,694(1978).The Village argues that
plaintiffs were injured not by the Village ordinance,but by the Illinois statute.A municipality
"cannot be held liable under section 1983 for acts that it did under the command of state or
federal law."Bethesda Lutheran Homes&Servs.,Inc.v.Leean,154 F.3d 716,718(7th Cir.
1998).But the Village was under no command to enact a content based panhandling ordinance—
an ordinance replicating the same constitutional flaws that doom the Illinois statute.
1 Are the Village of Downers Grove police officers entitled to qualified immunity?
The Village police officers assert qualified immunity.Qualified immunity is a doctrine
that shields government officials against damages suits.Officials are immune from suit unless
they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the violation.Harlow
v.Fitzgerald,457 U.S.800,818(1982).The right must be framed in"the specific context of the
case,not as a broad general proposition,"Saucier v.Katz,533 U.S. 194,201(2001),and its i
"contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right."Hope v.Pelzer,536 U.S.730,739(2002)(citation and quotation marks
omitted).A right can be clearly established without a case directly on point:"[A]general
constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific conduct in question,"giving officials"fair warning"that their acts are unconstitutional.
Id.at 741(citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Village police officers argue that they"are being sued because they did their jobs."
They argue that"[t]he enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers
3
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concerning its constitutionality—with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws."
Michigan v.DeFillinno,443 U.S.31,38(1979).They argue that the Seventh Circuit—forty years
ago—upheld Illinois'solicitation statute against a First Amendment challenge,holding that the
statute"is a narrow and reasonable limitation on solicitation in intersections which local villages
are required to enforce."U.S.Labor Party v.Oremus,619 F.2d 683,688(7th Cir. 1980).
The Village police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.Cases since U.S.Labor
Pgr1y"have placed the...constitutional question beyond debate."Ashcroft v.al-Kidd,563 U.S.
731,741(2011).The Supreme Court in Reed v.Town of Gilbert held that a speech restriction"is
content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed."576 U.S.155,163(2015).Following Reed,the Seventh Circuit in Norton v.
City f Springfield held that"[a]ny law distinguishing one kind of speech from another by
reference to its meaning now requires a compelling justification."806 F.3d 411,412(7th Cir.
2015)(granting rehearing and remanding with instructions to enjoin a content based panhandling
ban).This"compelling justification"standard is"met in practice only by a need as serious as the
battle against terrorists."Norton v.City of Springfield,768 F.3d 713,716(7th Cir.2014),citing
Holder v.Humanitarian Law Project,561 U.S. 1,130(2010).
Content based laws usually violate the First Amendment.The former Village ordinance
and Illinois statute are no exception.Both are content based restrictions on speech without any
compelling justification.Defendants do not seriously argue that that the laws are content neutral.
Nor do they argue that the laws are content based,yet supported by compelling justifications.
The laws are flagrantly unconstitutional under Reed and Norton(2015 ---and reasonably prudent
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police officers would have so concluded.The Village police officers violated clearly established
First Amendment law and are not entitled to qualified immunity.
The former Village ordinance and the Illinois statute discriminate based on content.
Solicitation is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.Gresham v.Peterson,225
F.3d 899,904(7th Cir.2000).Under the ordinance,a person soliciting money from drivers
stopped at a red light needed to have a certificate of registration.Downers Grove Municipal
Code,§ 15.30(a).If that same person instead proselytized religion or gathered signatures for a
referendum,no certificate was needed—the ordinance expressly exempted"political or religious
activities."Id.at§15.29.Whether the ordinance applied depended on"the topic discussed."
Reed,576 U.S.at 163.The ordinance discriminated based on content.
Illinois'statute is much the same.The statute makes it a misdemeanor to stand on a
highway and solicit money from people in cars.625 ILCS 5/11-1006(c).It also forbids soliciting
"employment or business."Id.at(b).The statute says nothing about,and thus presumably
allows,other forms of speech—protests,for example,or performance art.These are distinctions
based on meaning.Put another way,plaintiff Simmons panhandled with a sign reading,"GOD
BLESS U/ANYTHING HELPS&IS A BLESSING!Thank U!".Did Simmons violate the
statute?To answer that question,"enforcement authorities"had to"examine the content of the
message that is conveyed."McCullen v.Coakley,573 U.S.464,479(2014)(quoting another
source;quotation marks omitted).Simmons might have been in the clear had his sign included
just the first line.Only by examining the sign's contents could the Village police officers have
had probable cause to believe that Simmons's purpose was to solicit money.
The Illinois statute also discriminates based on class of speaker.The statute allows
municipalities to pass ordinances exempting charitable organizations,so long as those
5
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organizations register with the Illinois Attorney General and meet other regulatory requirements.
625 ILCS 5/11-1006(c)(1),(c)(2),(c)(3).Individual people enjoy no such exemption.First
Amendment doctrine"suggests little reason to distinguish between beggars and charities in terms
of the First Amendment protection for their speech,"Gresham,225 F.3d at 904,and the First
Amendment bars`restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,allowing speech by some
but not others."Citizens United v.Federal Election Commission,558 U.S.310,340(2010).That
constitutional defect—speaker-based discrimination—might also have tainted the Village
ordinance,although the ordinance was silent on whether individual people(distinguished from
charitable organizations)could lawfully have solicited money if they had registration certificates.
See Downers Grove Municipal Code,§§ 15.30,15.33.The ordinance was,in any event,
unconstitutional.
The Village police officers argue that they"should not be expected to divine evolving
developments and conclude that constitutional principles relating to content-based discrimination
would apply to a statute(designed in this case)to prevent pedestrians from endangering
themselves and distracting drivers at the busiest intersection in town."But qualified immunity
doctrine assumes that"a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct."Harlow,457 U.S.at 819.Reed,Norton(2015),and all the other First Amendment
cases cited in this opinion were on the books before 2018,when the officers started enforcing the
statute against plaintiffs.As for running into the busiest intersection in town,plaintiffs allege that
they stayed clear of traffic and avoided placing others at risk.That allegation must be taken as
true for now.And plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of other ordinance provisions
regulating solicitation—for example,the provision barring solicitors from"imped[ing]the flow
of pedestrian or vehicular traffic."Downers Grove Municipal Code,§ 15.32(h).
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2 Does plaintiff state a Monell claim against the Village of Downers Grove?
Plaintiffs claim that the Village enacted an unconstitutional ordinance.They claim that
Village had an official policy of enforcing this ordinance and that this policy violated their First
Amendment rights.See Thomas v.Cook County Sheriffs Department,604 F.3d 293,303(7th
Cir.2010).The Village argues that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Monell.
Plaintiffs state a Monell claim against the Village.The Village argues that a municipality
"cannot be held liable under section 1983 for acts that it did under the command of state or
federal law."Bethesda Lutheran Homes&Services.Inc.v.Leean,154 F.3d 716,718(7th Cir.
1998).But the Illinois panhandling statute did not force the Village to enact and enforce a
parallel ordinance.The statute allows charitable organizations to solicit money"when expressly
permitted by municipal ordinance."625 ILCS 5/11-1006(c).The Village cites no provision
ordering municipalities to adopt such ordinances.Panhandling might have violated both
ordinance and statute,but the laws—if unconstitutional—inflicted separate harms.Village
officers who enforced an unconstitutional municipal law might be liable even if state officers
could have enforced an identical,equally unconstitutional state law.
The Village also argues that plaintiffs never alleged that the Village cited plaintiffs for
violating the ordinance.Plaintiffs allege the dates that they received citations under the Illinois
statute and describe how some those citations were resolved.Plaintiffs allege little about having
received citations under the Village ordinances—certainly nothing as specific as their allegations
about the statute.
Still,plaintiffs'allegations raise an inference that they were injured even if they were i
never cited under the ordinance.The ordinance discriminates against the content of plaintiffs'
speech—it bans panhandling yet allows petitioning.That discrimination,even without fines,
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violates the First Amendment. "[I]n civil rights cases, nominal damages are appropriate when a
plaintiff's rights are violated but there is no monetary injury." Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of
Milwaukee, 821 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2016), citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67
(1978).And nominal damages are all plaintiffs need for their Monell claim to avoid dismissal.
See Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (reversing the dismissal
of a Monell claim with a damages cap of one dollar, reasoning that "nominal damages afford a
litigant vindication of the deprivation of his constitutional rights").
In any event, the Village has forfeited this argument. The Village argued in its motion that
the ordinance was irrelevant—all roads lead to the statute. "[W]ith or without the adoption of an
exception ordinance, [p]laintiffs were violating a state law, and at the time the [p]laintiffs were
cited, the statute set forth a command that people not stand on highways or at busy intersections
in order to solicit drivers."The Village did not argue that plaintiffs failed to allege that they had
been cited under the ordinance. That argument was raised for the first time in the Village's reply,
and "[t]he reply brief is not the appropriate vehicle for presenting new arguments or legal
theories to the court." United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 341 (7th Cir. 1996).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court dismisses as moot any claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief brought by plaintiffs Michael Dumiak and Christopher Simmons against defendants Village
of Downers Grove and its police officers. The court otherwise denies the motion to dismiss
[Doc. 41] filed by: (1) Village of Downers Grove; and (2) Village of Downers Grove police
officers Jeffrey Giermann, Robert Jacobs, Jay Johnson, Kenneth Lister,Alessia Marocco, and
Joshua Nelson.
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Defendants are directed to answer the complaint by August 28,2020.The parties are
directed to file a joint status report using this court's form by September 4,2020.The court will
set a status hearing after the COVID-19 emergency has abated.This order is not affected by any
General Orders entered by the court.
ENTER: July 29,2020
SAI`
1.�bertW.Gettleman
United States District Judge
9
Case: 1:19-cv-05604 Document#:32 Filed:01/14/20 Page 1 of 2 PagelD#:182
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL DUMIAK and CHRISTOPHER )
SIMMONS, )
Plaintiffs, )
V. ) No. 19-cv-5604
VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE; ) Honorable Robert W.Gettleman
Downers Grove Police Officers JEFFREY )
GIERMANN,ROBERT JACOBS,JAY )
JOHNSON,KENNETH LISTER,ALESSIA )
MAROCCO,and JOSHUA NELSON,in )
their individual and official capacities; )
BRENDAN KELLY,Acting Director of the )
Illinois State Police,in his official capacity; )
And ROBERT BERLIN,DuPage County )
State's Attorney,in his official capacity, )
Defendants. )
4QR7TrMTIPULATED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER
Plaintiffs Michael Dumiak and Christopher Simmons have moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent enforcement of a particular section of the Illinois Vehicle Code,625 ILLS
5/11-1006;and Defendants Brendan Kelly,the Director of the Illinois State Police,and Robert
Berlin, the DuPage County State's Attorney, do not oppose entry of an order enjoining their
enforcement of one provision of that section, 625 ILCS 5/11-1006(c). Based on the lack of
opposition to the proposed injunction against enforcement of 625 ILCS 5/11-1006(c),the Court
has determined that entry of a preliminary injunction is proper.
The parties understand and agree that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter and that
venue is proper.Defendants Kelly and Berlin further agree to waive the entry of findings of fact
Case: 1:19-cv-05604 Document#:32 Filed:01/14/20 Page 2 of 2 PagelD#:182
and conclusions of law for the purposes of this Order pursuant to Rules 52 and 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly,it is ORDERED:
I. Defendant Kelly,his successors,and any person or entity acting in the capacity of
an officer, agent, servant, employee or attorney of the Illinois State Police, are preliminarily
enjoined from enforcing 625 ILCS 5/11-1006(c),as amended by P.A.88-589,§10,eff.August 14,
1994,until further order from this Court,or final disposition of this case.
2. Defendant Berlin,his successors,and any person or entity acting in the capacity of
an officer,agent,servant,employee or attorney of the DuPage County State's Attorney's Office,
are preliminarily enjoined from enforcing 625 ILCS 5/1 I-1006(c),as amended by P.A. 88-589,
§10,eft.August 14,1994,until further order from this Court,or final disposition of this case.
3. Plaintiffs'motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to the remainder of 625
ILCS 5/11-1006 and all other requests for preliminary injunctive relief are withdrawn without
prejudice.
So Ordered.
Dated )y, 'f Z)
U.S.ETistrict Judge